Roland paused for several seconds, apparently composing himself before speaking. Then, in a measured tone, he said, “I just mean to say, first, that—again—the principle of sufficient reason is simply a self-evident truth. If it weren’t, there would still be no meaningful way of saying as much, since any argument for or against it depends upon its indubitability. Any argument from logic—any argument that this is true or this is false—is an argument that there’s a sufficient reason for affirming or denying the truth of something... that there’s some truth that makes this truth true. But that’s a trivial concern. Performative inconsistency is inevitable, since language isn’t a pellucid medium of truth, but only a sort of cleaver we wield to separate the sublime immensity of everything-all-at-once into more easily manipulated portions. Real knowing, real understanding, is finally beyond words; here below the moon, in the land of unlikeness, our words and meanings can’t quite align, and so we have to dance about between them, gesturing wildly now at the one now at the other but never reaching repose. No, my real problem with those who make arguments against the principle isn’t their inconsistency but rather their obtuse failure to recognize it. All their claims depend upon a confusion between the question ‘Why is this particular thing what it is?’ and the very different question ‘Why do things exist?’ Both are queries regarding the sufficient reason for something, admittedly, but they don’t obey the same logic—the same logic of necessity and contingency, I mean.”
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