As I listen to this, my dog has laid herself down at my feet. She never sleeps here. I can only assume it is the comforting nature of the voices in this conversation.
Half way through where you ask in effect, ‘how can a culture which has so ruined the Earth’s beauty be thought sane’ had me on my feet applauding. I often ask ‘how on earth are motor cars in any sense reasonable?’ - regrettably met with an embarrassed shuffling of the feet followed by a swift shift to noting how unseasonably warm the weather is . . .
“There are, as it happens, so many kinds of voices in the cosmos, and nothing is voiceless…” (1 Cor. 14:10 DBHNT).
What’s interesting to me is that the logismoi you described seem to have no little parallel with how large-language models function—it generates text by building on strings via pure semiotic association, statistically. I would perhaps submit that it behaves like the passions without the soul, so to speak.
I've read a lot about LLMs since I first became a full-time worrier about AI and its implications for philosophy of mind, and it was interesting to read something that focused so much on how the damn things actually work. He seems to be working, of course, from the assumption that what LLMs produce really is language, which strikes me as exactly the kind of "engineer brain" thinking David and Iain were deriding in the video.
I’d agree. Wolfram is extraordinarily intelligent (I believe he had his Ph.D. in theoretical physics before 22), but also quite idiosyncratic—it seems he’s rather mundane when it comes to his philosophical ground, though.
Ross’s ‘Beholding’ surely speaks to that loss of visual perception which is alluded to when DBH briefly mentions Roland. The Christian tradition certainly suggests a visual capacity which it’s reasonable to suggest is lost to us. Alas!
A couple of thoughts came to mind. John Deely (in 'Intentionality and Semiotics') does a good job in showing how Brentano's 'intentionality' differs drastically from the 'antique' version. In fact, it becomes a kind of 'epistemological nihilism', where 'external perception is not perception. Mental phenomena , therefore may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense is possible.' (Brentano).
I attempt a summary of Deely's arguments in 'The Primacy of Semiosis: an ontology of relations' - showing how Deely takes up John Poinsot's understanding of the ontology of relations and signs as being-toward 'esse-ad' - avoiding this kind of idealism.
Deely also coins the term 'cyclopean thomists' for thomists' obession with 'realism.' After all, we combine the extra-mental with fantasy and absent objects...He tells that story in 'On Purely Objective Reality.'
Also striking to note that Maturan and Varela could write in 1980:
'Valid descriptions of a system's actual operations ought to be concerned
with the system's internal dynamics, not with referring these
dynamics (its autopoiesis) to some external encompassing context. For
example, 'purpose' and 'aims' are not features of the organization of
any machine, living or otherwise. These terms arise in the domain of
external descriptions and ' have no explanatory value in the phenomenological
domain they pretend to illuminate, because they do not refer to
processes indeed operating in the generation of any of its phenomenon'
(Maturana and Varela. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel. 1980, 86).
Varela was a mentor to Evan Thompson, both of them buddhists.
David, can I put forth a suggestion for a topic of conversation to be had: Patrick Leigh Fermor- in general, because I know you liked him and his books- but perhaps more specifically a conversation about A Time To Keep Silence as it's more in keeping with the general themes of your work. Karen Armstrong comes to mind (as she wrote an introduction to the book and she writes about various religions), or his biographer Artemis Cooper. Maybe even someone like Colin Thubron. Anyway, just a thought. Many thanks.
As a quick question, Dr. Hart, you noted that you would radically rewrite the Beauty of the Infinite—have you changed your mind on the central thesis, or would you just restructure it?
Wow this conversation trancends my meager investigations into the topic. You always bring to light so many great vats of knowledge that the culture seems to shamefully ignore. I wishlisted his book immediately. Also, I always love your backgrounds, but this one is especially tranquil.
I'm definitely looking forward to your book on philosophy of mind! In the meantime I am wondering if you could recommend a couple of "introductory" texts, similar to the curated list I have seen published around the web regarding introductory theology texts (for example: https://theologianslibrarydotcom.wordpress.com/to-read-by-david-bentley-hart/)
From "The Experience of God" I have compiled:
Koons and Bealer, "The Waning of Materialism"
Hasker, "The Emergent Self"
Feser, "The Philosophy of Mind" (2005)
Eccles, "Evolution of the Brain"
Kelly, "Irreducible Mind"
Clark, "Athens to Jerusalem" Chapter 7
Nagel, "Mind and Cosmos"
Stapp, "Mindful Universe"
I imagine you will generously provide some bibliographical references in your new volume, a section I have come to truly enjoy in your books... I suppose I am asking for a sneak preview!
At 18 mins in you summarise the contrast between the ancient and modern approach to communion with the world in terms of presentation / representation and how, under the antique model, the object of consciousness and the mind can participate in a “single form” through participation etc. I appreciate that Iain gives his brief response but have you written about this in more detail somewhere? And can you point me to any other good reading that explores this? Thanks again.
Thank you for this riveting conversation. Granted that much of the 1960s counterculture turned into wretched excess, I'm wondering now if that counterculture might, in its essentials, have been a valiant, desperate--tragically failed--attempt by the human brain's right hemisphere to reassert itself.
I have only been able to listen to the first quarter, but I wonder if the left lobe can be understood at the seat of instrumental reason and the right that of transcendental thinking or thinking about thinking.
As I listen to this, my dog has laid herself down at my feet. She never sleeps here. I can only assume it is the comforting nature of the voices in this conversation.
Was able to get through about 30 minutes before having to go to work this morning. I note so far that right brain sounds very much like a Daoist.
Half way through where you ask in effect, ‘how can a culture which has so ruined the Earth’s beauty be thought sane’ had me on my feet applauding. I often ask ‘how on earth are motor cars in any sense reasonable?’ - regrettably met with an embarrassed shuffling of the feet followed by a swift shift to noting how unseasonably warm the weather is . . .
It has arrived! Much anticipated - I look forward to finding a comfortable chair and a decent glass of something befitting.
Absinthe?
A jug of foaming ale
“There are, as it happens, so many kinds of voices in the cosmos, and nothing is voiceless…” (1 Cor. 14:10 DBHNT).
What’s interesting to me is that the logismoi you described seem to have no little parallel with how large-language models function—it generates text by building on strings via pure semiotic association, statistically. I would perhaps submit that it behaves like the passions without the soul, so to speak.
For the curious, Steven Wolfram (whom I hold a deep ambivalence towards) has a lovely article introducing how ChatGPT (and LLMs generally) function here: https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2023/02/what-is-chatgpt-doing-and-why-does-it-work/
I've read a lot about LLMs since I first became a full-time worrier about AI and its implications for philosophy of mind, and it was interesting to read something that focused so much on how the damn things actually work. He seems to be working, of course, from the assumption that what LLMs produce really is language, which strikes me as exactly the kind of "engineer brain" thinking David and Iain were deriding in the video.
I’d agree. Wolfram is extraordinarily intelligent (I believe he had his Ph.D. in theoretical physics before 22), but also quite idiosyncratic—it seems he’s rather mundane when it comes to his philosophical ground, though.
Based on his Wikipedia page, Wolfram's something of a "pan-computationalist," right? So if you've already got a theory that "explains" everything...
This is the definition of a providential encounter.
Maggie Ross in her newest book silence has integrated iains work with her own. Have you read it?
I discovered McGilchrist through Ross :)
Ross’s ‘Beholding’ surely speaks to that loss of visual perception which is alluded to when DBH briefly mentions Roland. The Christian tradition certainly suggests a visual capacity which it’s reasonable to suggest is lost to us. Alas!
Fascinating - makes the internet worthwhile!
A couple of thoughts came to mind. John Deely (in 'Intentionality and Semiotics') does a good job in showing how Brentano's 'intentionality' differs drastically from the 'antique' version. In fact, it becomes a kind of 'epistemological nihilism', where 'external perception is not perception. Mental phenomena , therefore may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense is possible.' (Brentano).
I attempt a summary of Deely's arguments in 'The Primacy of Semiosis: an ontology of relations' - showing how Deely takes up John Poinsot's understanding of the ontology of relations and signs as being-toward 'esse-ad' - avoiding this kind of idealism.
Deely also coins the term 'cyclopean thomists' for thomists' obession with 'realism.' After all, we combine the extra-mental with fantasy and absent objects...He tells that story in 'On Purely Objective Reality.'
Also striking to note that Maturan and Varela could write in 1980:
'Valid descriptions of a system's actual operations ought to be concerned
with the system's internal dynamics, not with referring these
dynamics (its autopoiesis) to some external encompassing context. For
example, 'purpose' and 'aims' are not features of the organization of
any machine, living or otherwise. These terms arise in the domain of
external descriptions and ' have no explanatory value in the phenomenological
domain they pretend to illuminate, because they do not refer to
processes indeed operating in the generation of any of its phenomenon'
(Maturana and Varela. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel. 1980, 86).
Varela was a mentor to Evan Thompson, both of them buddhists.
The quote from Maturana and Varela is problematic, to say thr least, without context. And I don’t concur with Deely’s reading of Brentano.
Can you send a link to your Primacy of Semiosis essay?
Yes. It's a book published by Univ of Toronto Press.
https://utorontopress.com/9781442626980/the-primacy-of-semiosis/
Which means it'll be a mite pricey, I assume.
Anyway, I fly thither even now.
Wait. I sent you an email!
Great conversation, thank you.
David, can I put forth a suggestion for a topic of conversation to be had: Patrick Leigh Fermor- in general, because I know you liked him and his books- but perhaps more specifically a conversation about A Time To Keep Silence as it's more in keeping with the general themes of your work. Karen Armstrong comes to mind (as she wrote an introduction to the book and she writes about various religions), or his biographer Artemis Cooper. Maybe even someone like Colin Thubron. Anyway, just a thought. Many thanks.
As a quick question, Dr. Hart, you noted that you would radically rewrite the Beauty of the Infinite—have you changed your mind on the central thesis, or would you just restructure it?
I would add several secondary characters, many of them penguins. I feel the book suffers from a dearth of penguins.
Unfortunately, most books on philosophy lack their irreplaceable charm.
Wow this conversation trancends my meager investigations into the topic. You always bring to light so many great vats of knowledge that the culture seems to shamefully ignore. I wishlisted his book immediately. Also, I always love your backgrounds, but this one is especially tranquil.
Curious if you and McGhilchrist have encountered or engaged with Ogi Ogas and/or Stephen Grossberg's work on Consciousness studies?
I'm definitely looking forward to your book on philosophy of mind! In the meantime I am wondering if you could recommend a couple of "introductory" texts, similar to the curated list I have seen published around the web regarding introductory theology texts (for example: https://theologianslibrarydotcom.wordpress.com/to-read-by-david-bentley-hart/)
From "The Experience of God" I have compiled:
Koons and Bealer, "The Waning of Materialism"
Hasker, "The Emergent Self"
Feser, "The Philosophy of Mind" (2005)
Eccles, "Evolution of the Brain"
Kelly, "Irreducible Mind"
Clark, "Athens to Jerusalem" Chapter 7
Nagel, "Mind and Cosmos"
Stapp, "Mindful Universe"
I imagine you will generously provide some bibliographical references in your new volume, a section I have come to truly enjoy in your books... I suppose I am asking for a sneak preview!
David, many thanks for this nourishing dialogue.
At 18 mins in you summarise the contrast between the ancient and modern approach to communion with the world in terms of presentation / representation and how, under the antique model, the object of consciousness and the mind can participate in a “single form” through participation etc. I appreciate that Iain gives his brief response but have you written about this in more detail somewhere? And can you point me to any other good reading that explores this? Thanks again.
Thank you for this riveting conversation. Granted that much of the 1960s counterculture turned into wretched excess, I'm wondering now if that counterculture might, in its essentials, have been a valiant, desperate--tragically failed--attempt by the human brain's right hemisphere to reassert itself.
I have only been able to listen to the first quarter, but I wonder if the left lobe can be understood at the seat of instrumental reason and the right that of transcendental thinking or thinking about thinking.